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A series of experiments compares bargaining behavior under three different settings: no arbitration, 
conventional and final offer arbitration. Under no arbitration disputes with zero payoffs were around 
10%, while the pie was equally split in less than half of the cases. Under conventional arbitration - 
where the arbitrator is free in choosing his award - every third negotiation ended in dispute giving 
evidence for a modified chilling effect. Under final offer arbitration – where the arbitrator has to 
award to the bargainers either one of their final offers - there was only a small increase of disputes 
while equal splits have doubled to 80%. The experiment shows final offer arbitration, though having 
lower dispute rates, to interfer more with bargaining behavior than conventional arbitration where the 
bargaining behavior was similar to the no-arbitration treatment. Under final offer arbitration, 
negotiators adjust their bargaining strategy to the arbitrator´s expected award. 
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1. Introduction 
When considering the typical structure of bargaining behavior it seems that most negotiations 
are following the same ritual. Far from the efficient outcome as suggested by the Rubinstein 
Game [1982], each party usually tries to claim a large part of the pie for himself when two 
parties sequentially bargain about the split of a shrinking pie. Therefore, both parties often 
pose incompatible demands and offers. After expensive negotiations, in many cases 
bargaining parties tend to agree on compromises which are between the opening demands.2 
The gap between theory and practice can be explained by incomplete information. The 
information required for the Rubinstein outcome is prohibitively high: the size of the pie, the 
discount rates of the bargaining parties, their 'outside options' and their subjective preferences 
must be common knowledge to secure agreements without any frictions. Negotiations become 
more complex if there is incomplete information about any of these parameters. Then, both 
parties – after receiving first offers - may form expectations about each others´ preferences 
and consider these expectations in their own bargaining strategies (and vice versa).3 As 
Kennan and Wilson [1993, p. 46] put it “from an ex ante perspective the costly process of 
bargaining can be an efficient way of establishing a common information basis for an 
agreement“, even if it should lead ex post sometimes to a zero payoff for both parties. 
Introducing the institution of an arbitrator is, therefore, suggested as a prevalent policy to 
reduce negotiation cost. Agreements may be settled in less amount of time so that the 
bargaining cost, measured by a decreasing size or a complete loss of the pie, are considerably 
reduced. On the other hand, an arbitrator - if vested with the power to settle compulsory 
awards – may complicate negotiations. The bargaining parties have to consider possible 
settlements of the arbitrators in their own decision, as well. 
The two most diverging schemes, conventional and final offer arbitration, and their impact on 
bargaining behavior are in the focus of this paper.4 According to Conventional Compulsory 
Arbitration (CCA), the arbitrator is able to impose an award of his own choice if negotiations 
end in dispute, allowing him to choose freely among a continuum of potential outcomes. It 
was raised, however, that the awards might not be based on independent decisions of the 
arbitrators but may be affected by the bargaining process. Unyielding bargaining behavior 
will become predominant- the so called 'chilling effect', cf. Stevens [1966] - if arbitrators tend 
                                                 
2 For some field evidence on costly delays, cf. Kennan and Wilson [1990a,b]. Moreover, Ashenfelter and Currie 
[1990] documented that delays in the field are not very different from those observed in experimental studies. 
3 The central role of information in explaining bargaining behavior is discussed in the survey of Kennan and 
Wilson [1993]. See also Roth and Murnighan (1982) for the relevance of information in bargaining experiments. 
4 See Charness [1996] for a more general conceptual framework on alternative dispute resolutions where 
arbitration approaches are also related to other dispute resolution procedures. 4 
to split the difference between the final bargaining positions.5 In this case posing 
incompatible demands is the best strategy: Arbitrators can be called into action in due time, 
and dispute cost can be kept at a low level while the higher the last claim is before asking for 
arbitration the higher will be the share of the pie which the arbitrator will reward to the 
respective bargainer. 
The most provocative hypothesis with respect to this incentive was formulated by Borchardt 
[1990] who analyzed the bargaining outcomes under CCA in the late twenties of the German 
Weimar Republic. He believes that only one bargaining party (the unions) was making use of 
the strategic advantages of CCA. According to his analysis he came to the conclusion that the 
unions were posing excessive demands while the employers were suggesting zero increases 
for the wages. Arbitrators than decided according to the split the difference notion which 
allowed the unions to realize half of the wage increases they were demanding. Borchardt 
concluded that the unions were partly responsible for the Hitler regime because their wage 
demands caused the strong depression in Germany inducing sharp increases in votes for the 
Nazi-party. With this provocative thesis the so-called Borchardt controversy was released. 
And his suggestions about the behavior of CCA arbitrators motivated the present experiment. 
Hence, several studies observed that dispute rates increased under CCA, seemingly indicating 
that bargainers are discouraged to find an agreement on their own.6 CCA might sit on the 
fence between the advantage of cost savings and the disadvantage of higher dispute rates. To 
save the advantage and circumvent the disadvantage, Stevens [1966] proposed the other 
extreme among the arbitration schemes: The number of available awards is restricted to two, 
i.e. the arbitrator has to choose one of the final offers of the two bargaining parties as award, 
the Final Offer Arbitration (FOA).7 Dispute rates may decrease because, due to the limited 
number of available awards, parties are forced to make more conducive offers than under 
CCA so that agreements may be realized without any arbitration procedure. Some but not all 
empirical papers (e.g., Stern et al. [1975]) gave evidence for decreasing dispute rates. 
                                                 
5 For the chilling effect, see also Feuille [1975], Wheeler [1978]. Other arbitration effects which may cause 
unserious bargaining behavior are characterized as 'narcotic effect' (Wirtz [1963]) and as 'familiarity effect' 
(Farber and Katz [1979]). In contrast to the chilling effect these effects may arise only in repeated games even if 
the arbitrator has his own preferences about the awards, irrespective of the behavior of the bargaining parties. 
6 Field studies (Borchardt [1990], Currie and McConnell [1991]) and some experimental studies (Ashenfelter et 
al. [1992], Bolton and Katok [1998], Dickinson [2004]) show that dispute rates increase under conventional 
arbitration. See also Roth [1995]. 
7 There exist some further specific forms of FOA and of other intermediate schemes, where arbitrators have 
more than two but less than a continuum of choices to settle an award, such as issue by issue, nighttime-baseball, 
tri-offer, combined or multiple-final offer arbitration. See Donn [1977], Crawford [1979], Brams and Merrill 
[1986], Ashenfelter et al. [1992] and Charness [1996] for description and analysis of the expected behavior 
under each of these arbitration schemes. However, in this paper the focus is restricted to the two extreme points 
of arbitration, final offer and conventional arbitration. 5 
The incentives created by FOA were criticized for not being superior to those of CCA 
because the negotiating parties will be driven “to what the arbitrator desires. Rather than 
revealing their own preferences in the process, they reveal their perceptions of the arbitrator“ 
(Crawford [1979, p. 143]). Negotiators would not bargain in the same way with each other. 
Empirical evidence supports some of these assertions. Farber and Katz [1979] showed that the 
outcomes under CCA and FOA are different. Ashenfelter and Bloom [1984] found lower 
dispute rates and lower wage increases (in wage negotiations in the US) under FOA than 
under CCA indicating that bargaining behavior seems to be different under these two 
arbitration regimes. 
This paper aims to shed more light on the mutual effects between bargaining parties and 
arbitrators and on the impact of these two arbitration schemes on bargaining behavior. We 
will not only compare dispute rates under CCA and under FOA but also investigate to what 
extent bargaining behavior is influenced by the incentives of each arbitration scheme. This 
will allow us, as well, to suggest what kind of settlements the bargaining parties might expect 
when they ask for arbitration. We further aim to find typical decision pattern of arbitrators: 
are they influenced by the bargaining parties (cf. e.g. Borchardt [1990] Feuille [1975]) or do 
they develop independent 'appropriate' (Farber and Bazerman [1986]) or 'fair' (Crawford 
[1979]) award criteria. Last but not least it is of central interest whether the awards are 
substantially different due to the restricted number of choices in FOA. Answers to these 
questions will allow to gather new insights which design saves most of the advantage of 
arbitration (the cost reductions) without increasing the dispute rates and without deviating too 
much from bargaining behavior in negotiations without arbitration. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of related 
experiments. Section 3 describes the three experimental treatments, the basic Rubinstein 
Game without arbitration as well as the conventional and the final offer arbitration treatments. 
In section 4 the main results of the experiments are reported giving an overview over the 
complete bargaining process in the three treatments. In section 5 the two arbitration schemes 
are compared with respect to their impact on bargaining behavior. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Results of Related Experiments 
Since the basic treatment of the experimental setting is a multi-period Rubinstein game, 
earlier experiments with a similar design, as conducted e.g. by Neelin et al. [1988], Ochs and 
Roth [1989], Weg et al. [1990] and Bolton [1991], are an important benchmark. All 
experiments were Rubinstein games with three to twenty bargaining periods. In addition, 
Ochs and Roth [1989] varied discount factors and subgame-perfect outcomes. These studies 6 
report that only about half of the observed results could be captured either by the equal split8 
or by the subgame-perfect outcome, while half of the results need further explanation. All 
studies also show a small but significant share of break downs of negotiations with zero 
payoffs. Ochs and Roth suppose that players make strategic considerations leading for some 
of them to a first mover advantage (which is not ‘justified’ by subgame-perfectness). Players 
further “try to estimate the utilities of the players they are bargaining with, and some [other] 
players incorporate distributional considerations in their utility functions“ (Ochs and Roth 
[1989]).9 They also report that the subgame-perfect equilibrium is a poor qualitative predictor. 
Ashenfelter et al. [1992], Bolton and Katok [1998], Charness [2000], and Dickinson [2004] 
report first experimental work on bargaining under arbitration.10 These papers have one 
crucial point in common with respect to the experimental design: arbitration was not allocated 
to a person but was computerized, with stochastic awards drawn from a normal distribution 
with an expected value of an unequal split in cf. Ashenfelter et al. [1992], and (in two 
differing treatments) with an expected value of an equal as well as an unequal split of the pie 
in Bolton and Katok [1998]), and of an equal split in Charness [2000] and Dickinson [2004].11 
Except for Charness [2000], the three other approaches can be directly related to the present 
study. In comparison to bargaining behavior without arbitration, Ashenfelter et al. [1992] 
analyzed behavior under CCA and FOA, Bolton and Katok [1998] under CCA and Dickinson 
[2004] under CCA, FOA and a new approach designed by Brams and Merrill [1986]. 
All three experiments have in common that under CCA the frequency of disagreement was 
higher (presumably due to the lower cost of disagreement) than in the no-arbitration 
treatment. In addition, Ashenfelter et al. and Dickinson, observed that the dispute rates under 
FOA were not lower than under CCA. Bolton and Katok (who had no FOA treatment) found 
that in the equal split treatment under CCA usually the bargainer who was closer to the equal 
split asked for arbitration. Dickinson further revealed that dispute rates were highest under the 
combined arbitration approach, in contrast to the expectations of Brams and Merrill [1986]. 
                                                 
8 In some experiments the share of equal splits was slightly higher than 50%. 
9 A more general explanation for this outcome is given by Forsythe et al. [1991] who assert that the preferences 
of the participants are heterogenous. 
10 It should be emphasized that there is one more experiment by Deck and Farmer [2003] where the same 
arbitration design is used as in Ashenfelter et al. [1992]. Since their model and their experiment had a different 
focus than the present paper (bargaining behavior when there is asymmetric information about the pie size), it 
will not be further related to the discussion presented here. Their experimental design, however, provides an 
important insight to why wage increases are lower under FOA than under CCA – as it was observed by 
Ashenfelter and Bloom [1984]. 
11 There are further differences in the design of the experiments: Ashenfelter et al. [1992] introduce a time limit 
to the bargainers but no cost of decay and no restriction in bargaining periods. Bolton and Katok [1998] used a 
‘deadline game‘ (for more details see the previous version of Bolton [1995]). In comparison to Ashenfelter, 
Charness extended the time limit and introduced shrinking payoffs per 100 seconds of bargaining, while in 
Dickinson [2004] the time constraint was reduced and subjects were privately given suggested bargaining 
ranges. 7 
The three papers showed that the institution of arbitration increases dispute rates, irrespective 
of its design. However, by randomizing the decision of the arbitrator and by not having given 
any information about the related final offers which were done by the bargainers previous to 
the settlement of the arbitrator, the information about the last 100 settlements of an arbitrator 
is meaningless for the bargaining parties. At the same time, it makes almost explicitly clear 
that it is impossible to influence the arbitrator by any bargaining strategy. Thus, bargainers 
had no reason to chill their offers in order to influence the arbitrator in their favor. The 
observation of increased dispute rates must have other reasons. 
Bargainers might have been influenced by a computerized arbitrator in a different way than 
by a real person. A computerized arbitrator has the advantage that bargainers in experiments 
could be informed about ‘his’ (or better its) previous decisions.12 Nevertheless, it has to be 
pointed out that a random arbitration design with any kind of expected value contains some 
serious disadvantages, as well. First of all, the idea that arbitrators are statistically 
exchangeable is empirically not supported: Farber and Bazerman [1986, p. 1513] note that 
“arbitrators differ substantially in their evaluation of any particular scenario in both types of 
arbitration. This is important evidence that there is real uncertainty in the arbitration process 
due to differences among arbitrators in the awards they made in identical situations“. 
Second, the fact that there is a random draw needs to be discussed. Participants were 
explicitly (see e.g. Ashenfelter et al. [1992, p. 1412]) or implicitly informed (in the other two 
papers) that they are not able to influence the arbitrators´ decision by their bargaining 
behavior.13 Since they knew (in the experiment of Ashefelter) or probably anticipated (in the 
other experiments) the random award mechanism14 it is a dominant strategy of those players 
who are favored in the treatment with unequal awards and of risk-seeking, risk-neutral and to 
a certain extent even of the risk-averse players15 in the equal-award-treatments to pose claims 
higher than the equal split. Doing so they increased the probability of a dispute because the 
equal split was on average guaranteed by the special design of the experimental arbitrator in 
these three papers. Therefore, it should not be a surprise that dispute rates increased. 
The structure of the arbitration mechanism might also explain further findings of Ashenfelter 
et al. [1992] and Dickinson [2004]. They report that disputes were about the same under FOA 
and CCA. Since in their experiment both arbitration mechanisms relied on the same random 
                                                 
12 There are only few countries – the US among them - where bargainers in the field are provided with the 
information of the earlier decisions of arbitrators. In most countries this is not given, mostly because arbitrators 
– usually elder politicians - have no award history and act as arbitrators only once or twice in their lifetime. 
13 As one anonymous referee pointed out participants of Ashenfelter’s experiment were even explicitly 
reminded that the arbitrator’s decision is completely independent of any past bargainig behavior. 
14 A list of the last 100 decisions of the arbitrator without telling the participants the impasse offers of the two 
bargaining parties may even insinuate such information. 
15 Ashenfelter et al. [1992] argue that the data do ‘not indicate ... evidence of risk aversion‘ of bargaining 
parties. 8 
award mechanism and the distribution of the awards was "invariant to the arbitration scheme" 
[p. 1410], arbitration could not have a different impact on bargaining behavior, simply 
because the original chilling effect (which could only be unleashed when human beings act as 
arbitrators) was eliminated by the design of arbitration. 
These approaches showed that the behavior of the bargainers is influenced in their specific 
arbitration design in a completely different way than under a real arbitrator. Therefore, the 
existence of another chilling effect is revealed, namely that players who anticipate the effects 
of a random award mechanism with a certain expectation value have the dominant strategy to 
chill their final offer thus increasing the probability of a dispute. However, these experiments 
cannot give any answer to the questions whether CCA (done by a human being) increases 
disputes because bargainers hope to be able to influence the arbitrator by their respective 
bargaining strategy and whether FOA (also done by a human being) eliminates this effect. 
The focus of Charness [2000] is different and for other reasons important for the present 
study. The aim of Charness [2000, 285] is to find out whether “information about player types 
affects bagaining efficiency” where efficiency is measured as the number of agreements 
concluded without arbitration. The arbitration scheme plays a minor role. In this study, before 
they started bargaining, players had to make choices in a $5 Dictator Game and were labeled 
as high types (if they transferred more than $1.5) or low types (if they transferred less). In the 
basic treatment, players did not know the type they were matched with. What is most 
important for the later comparison to the present paper is that players who are labeled low 
types in his approach earned most in this treatment when they were matched with high types. 
In a second treatment players learned of the sorting process before the bargaining session but 
after the Dictator Game. In comparison to the first treatment, now high types had significantly 
lower dispute cost when they knew that they were matched with a high type. In contrast to 
this dispute cost were higher when low types were matched with high types (and they knew 
about the kind of matching) while average earnings now became the same for low and high 
types. 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
3.1 The Treatments 
The experimental design of the present study encompassed three different treatments, one 
treatment where the participants played a Basic  Rubinstein game (called BR treatment) 
without any arbitration, one with conventional, and one with final offer arbitration. All other 
conditions were kept identical. In all three treatments, two bargaining parties always had to 
sequentially negotiate to share a pie of 259 experimental currency units (ECU) (=13,25 Euro). 9 
In the BR treatment without arbitration, the bargaining parties made alternating offers. Time 
was divided into periods. In period 1, bargainer 1 had to divide the pie of 259 ECU between 
the two parties. He was only allowed to make integer offers. Bargainer 2 could reject or 
accept. In case of rejection, bargainer 2 had the chance to make a counteroffer. Subsequently, 
player 1 (player 2) could continue to make alternating offers in odd-numbered (even-
numbered) periods. Any further proposal beyond period two induced a shrinking pie of 10 
ECU per period. (The pie had in the third period the size of 249 ECU, etc.). Thus, the two 
players had both the ability for one costless proposal. Any further proposals reduced the pie 
size by 10 ECU (see also Appendix A). In all but the first period, bargaining parties had the 
choice between four options: i) to accept the division of the other party, ii) to make an own 
offer, iii) to ask the other party for another proposal in the next period (which actually never 
happened) and iv) to break off the negotiations. The experiment was designed as an ‘optional 
break-down game‘ where both parties received a zero payment when one party chose to end 
the negotiations. When both parties agreed on a division of the pie, they were paid according 
to this division. If no offer had been accepted until period 28, both parties received no payoff. 
In the second treatment bargaining parties had the option to ask for arbitration at any time 
(CCA treatment). Arbitrators could fashion compulsory awards based on their own choice, 
e.g. on the bargaining history or on any external judgment (e.g. a fair division). The 
bargaining design was the same as in the BR treatment. It changed only with respect to choice 
iv): the parties had the option to ask for conventional arbitration if the negotiations ended in 
disagreement. The bargaining cost per period (from period 3) were fixed – as in the BR 
treatment - at 10 ECU per period. Going to the arbitrator also costed 10 ECU. The third 
treatment was designed as final-offer arbitration (FOA treatment), again with compulsory 
awards. When negotiations ended in dispute (choice iv) bargaining parties had again the 
option to ask for arbitration. However, arbitrators chose now one of both parties´ final offer as 
settlement. Bargaining cost per round and arbitration cost were fixed again at 10 ECU. 
3.2 Procedures 
ORGANIZATION: In the entire experiment 300 undergraduate students from all faculties of the 
University participated in the three treatments as bargainers and 20 graduate students as 
arbitrators. Bargaining participants were recruited by verbal and written announcements. 
Their participation required appearance at a prearranged place and time, and was restricted to 
one session. Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned to their roles as bargainer 1 or 
2. 100 students were assigned to each treatment where two participants had to bargain with 
each other. Throughout the sessions participants were placed in two separate classrooms. All 
experiments were conducted once, after the participants had received written and verbal 
instructions about the setting, their four possible choices in every period and about the 10 
arbitration modus (see Appendix B). All participants were anonymously and randomly 
matched. Each participant had practiced one test-run where they played a complete game.16 
PROCEDURE: The negotiations were played sequentially. Together with the instructions 
bargainer 1 received in period 1 the bargaining record shown in Appendix A. Having made a 
proposal, the sheet was transferred to the assigned bargainer 2. He was expected to make one 
of the four choices mentioned above. The sheet was taken back and forth until an agreement 
or a disagreement (and in the arbitration treatments a compulsory award if requested) was 
settled. Participants were immediately informed about their payoffs. Throughout the sessions 
nobody was informed about the identity of his partner. Participants received their payoffs 
from a third party not involved in the experiment. Participants were required to reveal their 
password to the third party in order to get paid. These features ensured the one-shot nature of 
the experiments. Sessions lasted between 45 minutes and one hour. The average payoff was 
more than 5 Euro which covered the opportunity cost of participation. 
INFORMATION: Bargainers had complete information about the size of the pie, the bargaining 
cost and the arbitration mechanism, thus, the game was designed to be one of common 
knowledge about the "objective" payoffs.17 Moreover, they knew that the bargaining record 
(if their negotiations ended in dispute) would be anonymously passed to the appointed 
arbitrator. Participants were informed about the rules of conventional and final offer 
arbitration. 
ARBITRATORS: For each arbitration treatment 10 arbitrators were independently recruited 
from the graduate programs of the same university. Before they received the first dispute 
protocoll for arbitration, arbitrators were verbally instructed about their role in the negotiation 
process. They were informed about the procedures (as described above), and they were 
informed that they will receive anonymous bargaining records when negotiations end in 
dispute. Without being able to communicate with the bargaining parties they were then 
required to settle their own award in case of CCA or to choose one of the two final offers of 
the parties in case of FOA. Besides the bargaining protocol and the size of the pie no 
information was given to them. Arbitrators were paid about 2.5 Euro as a show-up fee 
regardless whether they had to make a decision and regardless of their decision. Seven 
arbitrators in the CCA treatment who had to stay longer for making a second award, received 
another 2.5 Euro to be compensated for their further effort. 
                                                 
16 The experiments were not repeated because this paper was not focused on learning curves. In order to make 
the participants sufficiently familiar with the experimental design, the test-run was introduced.  
17 At the same time it should be emphasized that players had – of course – incomplete information about the 
preferences of their bargaining partners. 11 
The aim of this fee structure was to cover the ‘expenses’ for the time the arbitrators had to 
spend for doing ‘their job’.18 Arbitrators were asked to make careful decisions. On purpose, 
arbitrators were given no incentives which would have induced connection between their 
decision and their payment. Accordingly, they were also informed that their decision does not 
affect the likelihood of their being chosen to do another arbitration. Ten arbitrators had to do 
one decision, three arbitrators had to make no decision and seven had to do two decisions. 
When a dispute occured, arbitrator were randomly selected by a neutral third party. The seven 
arbitrators who were randomly selected for second decisions were chosen irrespective of their 
previous award. 
An arbitration design like this resembles to the economic reality in many european countries 
(and in particular in the Weimar Republic where arbitrators were chosen by a third party not 
involved into the bargaining process). In addition, arbitrators in European Countries usually 
have no special training. Mostly they are receiving fixed payments irrespective of their award 
(either their salary when they are beaurocrats from a ministry or their pension when they are 
elder politicians beyond their active role in politics). In many cases, the pie of the bargaining 
parties is not reduced by the payment to the arbitrator. Bargainers19 perceive then arbitrators 
as a choice which only costs additional time but not additional money which is why we kept 
the reduction of the pie constantly at 10 ECU. 20 
3.3 Hypotheses 
Before we will present some hypotheses with respect to the three treatments, it has to be 
emphasized that with respect to the bargainers’ and experimenter’s expectations about the 
arbitrator’s jugdement this study is indeed exploratory. Since Farber and Bazerman [1986] we 
know that there is “real uncertainty in the arbitration process” so that we may expect that the 
judgement of the arbitrator depends on the type of the person. 
                                                 
18 From the point of view of keeping the cost low, it would have made sense to have only one or two arbitrators 
for the complete experiment. Then it would have been sufficient to pay 10 ECU per award without any show-up 
fee. However, since we were interested into the variety of possible awards, we decided to have about one 
arbitrator per award. 
19 Bargainers were only informed about the award cost of 10 ECU (see description about the design in sect. 
3.1). 
20 In this context, another critical point needs to be discussed. In the beginning of experimental economics, it 
was a “conditio sine qua non“ that all experimental payoffs of participants (i.e. in the present experiment also the 
payoff of the arbitrator) should depend on their choices. In the present experiment (as much as in reality) the 
payoff to the arbitrator was a fixed amount. Meanwhile, there are several further experiments without strategy 
dependent payments (see e.g. Charness and Rabin [2002] or Falk and Ichino [2003]) and some studies who 
analyzed the validity of experiments where some players received certain payoffs irrespective of their strategy 
(see e.g. Camerer and Hogarth [1999], or Leuven and Oosterbeek [2003]). It was concluded that the strategy 
dependent payoffs matter only if the experiment is rather ‚boring‘ and if it is repeated several times. This kind of 
description of experimental settings had nothing in common with the present experiment. Rather to the contrary, 
we observed the arbitrators to feel intrigued by the experimental setting. Most arbitrators were making e.g. 
calculations to find appropriate awards. 12 
For the BR treatment, although rejected in several experiments, the game theoretic outcome is 
used as hypothesis. The subgame-perfect equilibrium would be that bargainer 1 in his opening 
offer suggests an equal split and that bargainer 2 accepts that split. 
Hypotheses for the two arbitration schemes are more difficult to be derived since there is no 
normative model and since the decisions of the arbitrators depend on their personal attitudes. 
Accordingly, in this paper we are only able to offer hypotheses for different types of 
arbitrators. Basically, we can distinguish between two extreme kind of attitudes. Arbitrators 
may either consider the bargaining behavior of the two parties and try to mediate between the 
individual bargaining situation of the two parties which might but must not lead to a split-the- 
difference award. If turned abside down, this means that negotiators are able to influence the 
arbitrator with their kind of bargaining. If, in contrast to this, arbitrators have their own fair or 
appropriate award criteria, whatever fair or appropriate means, they may decide according to 
their own considerations independently of the two parties’ bargaining behavior.21 
These two potential attitudes unfold very differing incentives for the bargaining behavior 
under the two arbitration schemes. Starting with CCA, if we use the chilling effect as 
benchmarking hypothesis, the effect on which the earlier critics of Stevens [1966] and 
Borchardt [1990] are based, arbitrators would make awards dependent on the impasse offers 
of the two bargaining parties. If bargaining parties expect such awards they will claim infinite 
amounts or at least the complete pie for themselves. Parties, further, would make no 
concessions and would ask for arbitration after one bargaining period. This would lead to a 
100% dispute rate. The presumed award would be the equal split of the pie. 
If we assume that the arbitrator decides only according to his own fairness standard and if we 
further assume that in the present experiment the fairness standard is the equal split, then 
again we should expect the equal split to be the outcome of the game. However, in contrast to 
the chilling effect, now also the bargaining parties – if they anticipate the arbitrator to decide 
according to his own fairness standard - will be expected to find an agreement without 
arbitration. If, nevertheless, their negotiations end in disagreement e.g. because further rounds 
of bargaining are too costly for them, they may expect the equal split to be awarded. 
Assuming under FOA that the arbitrator decides according to his own fairness standard and 
that the award would be the final offer that is closer to the equal split if none of the final 
offers is the equal split, bargaining parties would then – given that they expect such awards - 
agree on the equal split without arbitration in order to avoid an award favoring the other 
player. 
                                                 
21 There exist, of course, more than these two attitudes. Arbitrators might have other unexpected fairness 
standards and they are also able to ‘punish’ bargainers for inappropriate bargaining behavior. However, for 
reasons of tractability we will restrict the suggested hypotheses to these ‘most obvious’ behavioral norms. 13 
FOA does not allow any split the difference awards. The chilling effect is foreclosed by the 
design. The number of potential patterns is reduced by this award system.22 
The comparison of these hypotheses also makes clear under which conditions FOA and CCA 
may lead to similar outcomes, namely if the arbitrator determines his own fairness standard 
and feels committed to this standard before being asked for arbitration. In this case, he will 
choose always the same award irrespective of the arbitration mechanism chosen - or (under 
FOA) will choose the final offer being closer to his standard (for similar reasoning, cf. 
Crawford [1979]). The problem of committing to such a standard and to exclude the 
possibility of making split-the-difference or any other middle ground awards should not be 
discussed any further here. 
Before we come to the results section, it is, however, important to note the sharp contrast 
between the two arbitration schemes. At first glimpse, it seems as if it makes no difference 
which arbitration scheme is chosen, since they all may lead to the equal split, at least if the 
expectations of the bargainers and their behavior coincides. However, the set of solution 
standards which the arbitrator is able to apply in his decision making is reduced under FOA in 
comparison to CCA. Under FOA, the arbitrator is only able to realize his own fair or 
appropriate standard as award. Under CCA, the arbitrator can do both, apply his own standard 
but also consider the individual bargaining history of the two parties which might differ from 
case to case. His additional discretion can be seen as opportunity (in the sense of adjusting the 
award to the individual claims) or as a source of misuse (in the sense of the chilling effect).23 
Thus, the two arbitration mechanisms have different incentives for the two bargaining parties 
to reveal their preferences and will therefore influence the kind and number of deliberate 
agreements between the bargaining parties. 
It also becomes clear that the above derived hypotheses for the CCA treatment depend on 
consistent expectations of the bargaining parties about the arbitrator’s behavior. Moreover, 
inconsistency in the expectations does not matter, as long as the expectations of both 
bargaining parties are such they expect the arbitrator to make an award according to his own 
fairness standard. Even in this case, the bargainers will (with high probability) deliberately 
agree on a split close to the expected award of the arbitrator, here the equal split. The 
                                                 
22 It is nevertheless important to make clear what would happen if an arbitrator is confronted under FOA with 
two diverging final offers of, say, party A demanding 70% and party B demanding 60% of the pie. The 
arbitrator has then the choice between two unequal outcomes (70% to 30%) or (40% to 60%) but is neither able 
to make an award which is adjusted to the final offers meaning in this case an award of about 54% to 46% nor to 
propose an equal split. 
23 It should be emphasized that the outcomes under the two arbitration schemes might be completely different if 
the assumption about a fair award does not hold. If for instance there is biased judgement about a fair outcome 
(because there is no equal split or because the equal split is seen for whatever reasons as an unfair outcome) the 
expected outcome is different (and difficult to be determined). For a discussion around the problems of finding a 
fair award when there is biased judgement between the two bargaining parties, see Babcock et al. [1995]. 14 
arbitrator will not be called into action, even if he would have announced an award different 
of the expectations of the bargainers. This reveals that the arbitrator’s attitude matters only if 
at least one bargainer expects to be able to influence the arbitrator in his decision making by a 
certain bargaining behavior. 
4. Results 
This section starts with the presentation of dispute rates in the different treatments. Following, 
we will discuss typical patterns of bargaining behavior, explaining the dispute rates and other 
results of each treatment. As already noted, the BR treatment serves the purpose of being a 
baseline for comparison with the arbitration treatments and may provide insights into how 
different designs of arbitration may influence the bargaining behavior. 
Ahead of the presentation of the results which is supported by several tables and figures, it 
has to be emphasized that in the second and fourth column of table 2 as well as in Figures 1a, 
b and 2 the final claims are displayed as if the pie has always the hypothetical size of 259 
ECU, i.e. it is not shrinking.24 This is done in order to enable a comparison of all final claims. 
Moreover, it should be clarified that we define an equal split as an agreement where the 
difference between the outcomes of the two parties is less than 4 ECU. A completely equal 
split was not possible due to the design of the experiment. 
4.1 Dispute Rates 
Table 1 displays the dispute rates for each treatment. In the BR treatment 8% of the 
negotiations ended in disagreement – players received no payment at all. As expected from 
previous studies the dispute rates were increased by the introduction of conventional 
arbitration from 8% in the BR treatment to 34% in the CCA treatment.25 (Fisher´s test show 
these differences to be significant, with p= 0.001, see Siegel and Castellan [1988]).26 
- insert Table 1 about here - 
In contrast to this the FOA treatment shows that the final offer arbitration - where 14% of the 
negotiations ended in disagreement - does not significantly increase the dispute rates if 
                                                 
24 Thus, when e.g. the bargaining parties negotiated for four periods the pie as calculated in Table 2 had still the 
size of 259 ECU instead of 239 ECU. An offer of bargaining party 1 in period 4 of  200 ECU for itself and of 39 
ECU for party 2 (thus, with a pie size of 239 ECU) was transferred into a claim of 210 ECU for bargaining party 
1 and an offer of 49 ECU for party 2. 
25 This compares to 11.2% in the Ashenfelter et al. [1992] treatment with no arbitration and 33.8% under a 
similar CCA. Moreover, these results show a certain consistency with the field experience: Ashenfelter and 
Bloom [1984] found that about every third wage-negotiation is solved by arbitration. 
26 Besides, the cost of arbitration might also have an influence on the rate of disagreement, see Bloom [1981]. 
However, this factor was not varied in the present study. 15 
compared to the BR treatment (Fisher´s test shows p=0.26) while a comparison of the FOA 
with the CCA treatment shows a significant decrease in disputes (p=0.017). 
Result 1: Under BR 8% of the negotiations end in dispute with a zero payoff. Under 
conventional arbitration, dispute rates are significantly increased. Under FOA dispute rates 
are nearly as low as under BR. 
Thus, arbitration is apt to prevent losses of the pie. However, dispute rates between the two 
arbitration treatments differ which is in contrast to the results of Ashenfelter et al. [1992] and 
Dickinson [2004]. It seems, as if CCA indeed increases dispute rates and as if FOA eliminates 
this effect. In order to understand the reasons for the differing outcomes in the treatments we 
will analyse further details of the bargaining process. 
4.2 Disagreements and Awards 
The question which party asked for arbitration allows to gather first insights into the 
expectations of the bargaining parties. To differentiate the bargainers, the party whose first 
claim in periods 1 and 2 was above the median claim will be called 'the far bargainer', the 
party whose first claim was lower than the median claim will be called 'the close bargainer'. 
The cut-off values for median claims where 165 ECU in the BR treatment, 190 ECU in the 
CCA treatment and 170 ECU in the FOA treatment. 
In the CCA treatment there were 18 matches of a far with a close bargainer and 16 matches of 
a far with a far and 16 matches of close with a close bargainer. Furthermore, under the CCA 
treatment 17 negotiations ended in dispute. In 12 of the dispute cases a far was matched with 
a close bargainer. Thus, 2/3 of all far/close matches ended in dispute. More often, far (in 9 
cases) than close bargainers (in 3 cases) called for arbitration (p=0.073, one-tailed binomial 
test).27 In 11 cases the arbitrators suggested an unequal split (Figure 1a), similar to difference-
splitting and, thus, in favor of the far bargainer. There was one award that allocated the equal 
split to both bargainers (where the far bargainer had asked for arbitration). Far bargainers 
when matched with close bargainers were mostly awarded with a 'split the difference' 
decision and, hence, with more than 50% of the pie.28 Figure 1b shows that in the other 5 
cases two far bargainers were matched, about 1/3 of all far/far matches. Moreover, in the 5 
cases the bargainers made offers which were similarly far away from the equal split.29 The 
arbitrator awarded the equal split. If two close bargainers were matched, a solution was 
always found without arbitration. 
                                                 
27 This is in contrast to Bolton and Katok [1998] where mostly the close bargainer induced arbitration. 
28 The average award allocated to the 11 far bargainers was 151 ECU (minus the negotiation cost per period). 
29 These 5 cases also differ from the mentioned 12 negotiations as they took more than four bargaining periods. 16 
- insert Table 2 and Figures 1a, b and 2 about here - 
In the FOA treatment 7 disputes were observed, all matchings of far with close bargainer (see 
Figure 2). Here, in 5 cases it was the close and in 2 cases it was the far bargainer who asked 
for an external award.30 In two cases the arbitrator had the choice between an equal and an 
unequal split (the two final offers) and preferred the equal split. In five cases the arbitrator 
had to choose between two unequal splits. In all five cases the less unequal split (which was 
always the final offer of the close bargainer) was awarded, thus in favor of the close 
bargainer. 
Result 2: (1) Under CCA, far bargainers more often than close bargainers ask for arbitration. 
Awards correspond to the split the difference notion and are in favor of the far bargainer, if he 
is matched with a close bargainer. When two far bargainers are matched the award resembles 
to the equal split. (2) Under FOA, close bargainers ask more often for an award. Arbitrators 
always prefer the less unequal split, i.e. they decide in favor of the close bargainer. 
At this stage it is also interesting to compare the dispute rates in this experiment with those of 
Charness [2000]. Since there is no information about first claims and about the dynamics of 
negotiations in the experiment of Charness [2000] we do not know whether bargainers who 
are labeled here as far (close) bargainers are similar to the low (high) bargainers in Charness 
[2000]. Nevertheless, it is apparent that similar to the present results in the treatments of 
Charness dispute rates were also always highest when cross types were matched. 
4.3 Opening Offers 
In order to reveal the path leading to the diverging dispute rates, it is necessary to analyze 
opening and final offers. Starting with the opening offer, Table 1 compares the average first 
claims in all treatments. The average first claim in the BR treatment was around 180 ECU. As 
Table 3 further shows, in about 80% of the cases it was far from the subgame-perfect opening 
offer.31 Bargaining parties were testing their partner´s willingness of rejecting unequal splits. 
This strategy was successful not only in the sense that in this treatment 6 bargainers realized a 
kind of first mover advantage where their bargaining partner did agree to the unequal split, 
but also in the sense that bargainers, when confronted with a counter-offer, tried to find out 
the type they were matched with. This kind of bargaining strategy corresponds to the 
                                                 
30 A Fisher test reveals that the differences between FOA and CCA is significant with respect to the question of 
who called for arbitration (p < 0.05). 
31 Similar results are found in many other experiments, see e.g. Ochs and Roth [1989], Bolton [1991] and in the 
overview of Roth [1995] where it is also emphasized that the subgame-perfect outcome is a poor point predictor. 
The reason for the particularly low share of subgame-perfect offers in the present experiment might be that the 
negotiation cost per period were (with 10 ECU) relatively low. 17 
approach of Kennan and Wilson [1993] where the level of the opening demand is one way of 
exchanging signals between the bargaining parties. 
- insert Table 3 about here - 
As Table 1 further shows, the average opening offer significantly increased to 192 ECU in 
the CCA treatment compared to the BR treatment. (The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reveals 
D=0.268 leading to χ2 = 7.18, for df=2 is p=0.03). In contrast to this, the average first claim 
in the FOA treatment was almost the same as in the BR treatment. 
By comparing the average first claim ending in dispute with the average first claim leading to 
an agreement (without having sorted into far or close bargainer) it is possible to further reveal 
the influence of the arbitration design on bargaining behavior (Table 2). The average first 
claim in the CCA treatment leading in later periods to disagreement – the ‘disagreement 
claim’ - was with 224 ECU as high as in the BR treatment (220 ECU). The same holds for 
observations leading to an agreement: the average first claim – the ‘agreement claim’ - was 
176 ECU in the CCA and in the BR treatment. Differences between first claims leading to an 
agreement and those leading to a dispute are highly significant under CCA. (The Mann 
Whitney U test shows for CCA U=304, p<0.0003).  
There is another striking observation. The chilling effect - as also hypothesized in section 3.3. 
- expects negotiators under CCA that they may demand infinitely high claims or at least the 
complete pie (and that they would not make any further concessions) in order to influence the 
arbitrator in their direction. In the CCA treatment there was only one participant who 
demanded the whole pie of 259 ECU for himself.32 
We observed that more persons were posing the ‘disagreement claim’ under CCA but that the 
disagreement claim was not higher under CCA than under BR.33 Thus, this experiment 
indicates an absence of the chilling effect, as it was originally defined. The observed  higher 
number of disagreement claims could be labelled as “modified chilling effect”. 
Considering the FOA treatment, Table 3 reveals differences in the distributional structure of 
first claims between the FOA and the BR treatment. While in the BR treatment the first 
claims are divided into two segments - about 50% of the participants claimed for themselves 
amounts between 130 and 165 ECU and about 40% amounts between 200 and 250 ECU, in 
the FOA treatment almost 80% of the participants posed first claims less than 200 ECU.34 
                                                 
32 Having asked for arbitration, this bargainer was awarded with slightly less than half the pie (see Figure 1a). 
33 Concession during the subsequent bargaining periods were - as we will show in the next subsection – also the 
same under BR and CCA. 
34 The first demands were clustered into three groups (group 1 contained claims between 100 and 140 ECU, 
group 2 between 140 and 200 ECU and group 3 between 200 and 250 ECU). A χ2-test comparing the subgroups 
of the BR treatment with the FOA treatment reveals that the hypothesis that the share of first claims was for the 18 
Thus, first claims in the FOA treatment were (with almost 180 ECU) on average the same 
regardless whether negotiations were concluded by arbitration or by agreement. A 
considerable number of players were perhaps afraid of provoking an early break-off of the 
negotiations so that only about 20% of the first claims were higher than 200 ECU. 
Result 3: (1) The first claims in the CCA treatment and in the BR treatment show the same 
spread where participants in negotiations ending in disagreement systematically pose higher 
claims then in negotiations ending in agreement. There are more participants in the first 
period of the CCA treatment than in the BR treatment demanding the ‘disagreement claim‘. 
(2) The first claims in the FOA treatment are on average not higher than in the BR treatment 
but are different in their distribution structure. In negotiations ending in disagreement, the 
first claims were not higher than in negotiations ending in agreement. 
The present experiment, thus, reveals that the chilling effect in negotiations is not necessarily 
caused by the arbitration system. It is rather that there are different types of bargainers  who 
decide to chill the negotiations by increasing first claims even if they do not have the safety 
net of arbitration. CCA then increases the number of chilled first offers, but these first offers 
are not higher than under BR while FOA rather decreases the number of chilled first offers. 
4.4 Final Offers and Concessions 
Table 2 displays the average final claims (the claim is displayed as if the pie does not shrink). 
Again, results are disaggregated with respect to the fact whether negotiations ended in 
agreement or disagreement. In case of an agreement, Table 2 shows the average amount 
which the far bargainer received in case of an unequal split. In case of a dispute it shows the 
average impasse offer of the far bargainer and his average payoff in case of an unequal award. 
The first result is that in the BR treatment only 38% of all negotiations resulted in an equal 
split. Thus, more than half of all negotiations were concluded with an unequal split. The 
average payoff of the 27 far bargainers was 152 ECU (using the full size of the pie), or 
58.9%.35 No far bargainer received less than 50%. It has to be emphasized that making a far 
offer mostly did not pay off. Due to the shrinking pie there were only few far bargainers who 
were able to realize a higher amount of money (in absolute terms) than if they had proposed 
the equal split at the first round of bargaining and if the other bargainer had agreed on it. 
                                                                                                                                                          
BR and the FOA treatment the same in the three subgroups can be rejected at p<0.05; χ2 = 6.9, df=2. 
35 Similar low shares of equal splits were found in a five period Rubinstein game by Neelin et al. [1988] and in 
the unstructured time limited bargaining game by Ashenfelter et al. [1992]. Interestingly, there are also similar 
shares of equal splits in the Ultimatum Game, cf. inter alia Forsythe et al. [1994] and Güth [1995]. This might 
indicate that bargainer types who bargain according to their subjective preferences might have a stronger impact 
on the outcome than the incentive structure of a certain bargaining game. 19 
In contrast to this, in the arbitration treatments most negotiations resulted in an equal split if 
the parties succeeded to find an agreement. This result is supported by column 4 which shows 
the number of equal splits, namely 27 of 33 (82%) in the CCA and 39 of 43 (90%) in the FOA 
treatment (shares are related to the negotiations ending in an agreement). The payoff of the far 
bargainer was significantly lower in both arbitration treatments than in BR (p<0.001). 
The differing impact of the two arbitration methods, however, becomes particularly clear 
when we relate the shares of equal splits to the total observations in each treatment. In the 
conventional arbitration treatment, more participants (54%) accepted an equal split (which is 
already significantly higher than in the BR treatment, p=0.04). Further, the share of equal 
splits climbs to 78% in the FOA treatment, significantly more than in any other treatment (the 
Fisher test reveals p=0.01 when comparing the FOA with the CCA treatment). 
Another striking difference appears when we analyze the willingness to make concessions 
during the bargaining process. By comparing the average first and final offers (see coloums 1, 
2, and 4 in Table 2) and by taking into account the average number of baraining periods, it 
appears that in the BR and CCA treatment participants were ready to make similar 
concessions of about 10 ECU per bargaining period to their bargaining partners as the 
number of periods increased. This observation holds for both treatments irrespective whether 
the bargainers opened negotiations with an ‘agreement’ or a ‘disagreement claim’. The same 
behavior was observed in the FOA treatment when the negotiators made an agreement. In 
those cases ending in dispute under FOA, far bargainers made almost no concessions. 
Result 4: (1) Compared to the BR treatment, in the FOA treatment more than in the CCA 
treatment the existence of an arbitrator induces far bargainers to voluntarily agree on an equal 
split when they are matched with a close bargainer. (2) In the BR and in the CCA treatment 
bargainers make similar concessions. In contrast to this in the FOA treatment, if negotiations 
end in dispute, far bargainers tend to make fewer concessions during the negotiations. 
4.5 Bargaining Periods and Payoffs 
Finally, we analyzed whether the arbitration design has an impact on the number of 
bargaining periods. The chilling effect under CCA in its extreme form would  suggest that 
bargainers would ask for arbitration immediately after the first proposal. Table 2 shows for all 
treatments the average number of bargaining periods in case of a settlement and in case of a 
dispute. 
- insert Table 4 about here - 
First of all, it becomes apparent that in all treatments the average number of bargaining 
periods was shorter when the parties came to an agreement. Thus, even in the arbitration 20 
treatments the participants did some additional efforts to come to an agreement without 
arbitration. The comparison of the FOA with the CCA treatment (Table 4) shows that 
participants were even more patient or cautious under the FOA treatment and preferred 
another period of bargaining before they submitted to the arbitrator.36 
Result 5: Negotiations ending in dispute were proceeded over a higher number of bargaining 
periods, irrespective whether arbitration was available. 
With respect to cost savings, arbitration may reduce the cost of bargaining in two ways: by 
reducing the number of bargaining periods and by excluding zero payoffs to both bargainers 
after a disagreement.37 In the present experiment, bargainers did not realize any cost savings 
due to a smaller number of bargaining periods. Cost savings were only incurred by asking for 
arbitration in case of a dispute (see result 1). 
5. The Impact of Compulsory Arbitration 
Based on the regularities of bargaining behavior which can be found in the three treatments, 
this section will discuss the impact of the different arbitration schemes on the bargaining 
process. We also aim to compare bargaining patterns under both arbitration schemes with the 
typical bargaining behavior in the BR treatment. 
Similar to previous studies, we could reject the first hypothesis (provided in section 3.3.) that 
bargaining parties always agree on the equal split (the subgame perfect outcome) after one 
round of bargaining. Moreover, as was found already in several earlier studies, the 
observations in the BR treatment make it reasonable to assert that bargainers have 
heterogenous preferences being not only related to the subgame perfect outcome.38 In the 
present study, we roughly categorized the parties into two types according to the distribution 
of opening offers in the BR treatment: close and far bargainers with a cut-off value such that 
they are equally distributed. Due to the random matching we may further assume that same 
type and cross type matchings appeared both in about 50% of all cases. 
The outcomes in the last section showed (see also Table 5) that it is possible to capture the 
regularities in the BR treatment as follows: All matches of close with close bargainer and 
most of the matches of far with far bargainer lead to an equal split. Three cases of a far-far 
                                                 
36 A statistical comparison showed that in the BR and the CCA treatment parties negotiated over a similar 
number of bargaining periods (see Table 4). In contrast to this result, comparison of the CCA and the FOA 
treatment showed a lower number of bargaining periods in CCA (p=0.067). 
37 See Currie and McConnell [1991] who showed similar results for field data. 
38 Earlier research found that there is not only an equilibrium-depedent but also a type-dependent bargaining 
bheavior. See Malouf and Roth [1981], Ochs and Roth [1989] and, more recently, Charness [2000] who 
distinguished between bargainer types in a similar way as in the present paper. 21 
matching ended in a break down. When far bargainers were matched with close bargainers, 
all but one close bargainer were willing to accept an unequal split of the pie.  
 
  Far-Far matching  Far-Close Matching  Close-Close Matching 
BR  Equal splits if no 
dispute 
3 Disputes 




CCA  Equal splits if no 
dispute 
5 Disputes. 
Award: Equal Split 
Equal splits if no dispute 
12 Disputes: 
Awards: 11 Splits in favor of far bargainer             
(split the difference), 1 equal split 
Equal splits 
No Disputes 
FOA  Equal Splits 
No disputes 
Equal splits if no dispute 
Awards: 5 Splits in favor of close bargainer, (no 
equal split available), 2 equal splits 
Equal Splits 
No disputes 
Table 5: Overview over the results of the three treatments 
In the CCA-treatment, the chilling effect as hypothesized in section 3.3. was not observed. 
There was only one bargainer asking for the complete pie in the first round and all bargainers 
were negotiating for about the same number of periods, were making similar opening offers 
and similar concessions per round as in the BR treatment. The only difference to be 
oberserved was that a higher number of bargainers made a ‘disagreement claim’ (see Table 3) 
instead of an ‘agreement claim’. We, thus, reject the existence of a chilling effect (as 
hypothesized in 3.3.) and we may call this differing behavior a ‘modified chilling effect’. 
With respect to the matchings (Figure 5) we found that negotiations of the same types resulted 
again in an equal split. The CCA treatment changed the outcomes of far-far matchings 
insofar, as negotiations which might have ended in dispute without arbitration are settled now 
by an equal split award. The most obvious and significant differences between the CCA 
treatment and the BR treatment are in cross-type matchings. In the BR treatment, all these 
negotiations ended in an unequal split. Under CCA an unequal split was only observed when 
arbitrators were asked for an award. Those half of the far-close matchings where the 
negotiations resulted in an agreement, the pie was splitted almost equally between the two 
parties. 
This behavior may allow to make first assertations about the expectations of the bargainers. It 
seems as if some far bargainers were not sufficiently sure whether they can expect a split-the-22 
difference solution as award. These far bargainers preferred an equal or a less unequal 
settlement with a close bargainer to the dispute resolution by the third party.  
It also seems as if close bargainers now were not willing to deliberately agree on the kind of 
unequal splits in the CCA treatment, as close bargainers did in the BR treatment when they 
were matched with a far bargainer. Those far bargainers who asked then for arbitration in the 
CCA treatment (most negotiations in the CCA treatment were called off by the far bargainer) 
may have expected that arbitrators will decide in their favor. Indeed, they were awarded with 
the kind of solution they might have been expecting.39 
Turning to the final offer arbitration, all hypotheses posed in section 3.3. with respect to FOA 
were met to a much higher extent than in the other two treatments: i) Bargainers mostly found 
solutions without a dispute. ii) They agreed on an equal splitting of the pie during the 
negotiations. iii) Arbitrators, if called into action, chose the impasse offer as award which was 
closer to the equal split, irrespective whether this impasse offer was made by the close or the 
far bargainer. 
Again, when the same types were matched, the equal split resulted. Differences to the CCA 
treatment exist insofar as in far-far matchings no award had to be made by the arbitrator - 
even these bargaining parties were always able to find an agreement without dispute 
resolution. With respect to the cross-matchings, it is remarkable that more bargaining parties 
were agreeing to an equal split than in any other treatment. The incentives set by this 
arbitration mechanism seem to be so strong that heterogenous preferences are not expressed 
anymore (see also Footnote 35). As Table 3 revealed all bargainers were more cautious from 
the first round of the negotiations and posed much lower opening claims and made almost 
always concessions leading to the equal split.  We will label this as ‘destiny effect’. 
Finally, with respect to the 7 cases of arbitration which all appeared in cross-matchings, under 
FOA (in contrast to CCA) it was mostly the close bargainer who was asking for an external 
award indicating that under FOA the close bargainer expected to be favored by the arbitrator. 
This expectation received support as the arbitrator always chose the final offer which was 
closer to equal split and which was always posed by the close bargainer. 
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
The present experiment gives incidence that the bargaining outcome in a Rubinstein Game 
depends on the design of the arbitration mechanism. Asking the hypothetical question of 
                                                 
39 Of course it is not yet clear, whether arbitrators would have announced the same kind of split-the-difference 
solution if the far bargainers had behaved as suggested by the chilling effect, i.e. asking for the full amount of 
the pie and making no concessions. 23 
which arbitration design should be installed, the choice depends on the purpose of the 
institution to decide. If the aim is to guarantee completely non-intervened negotiations, no 
arbitration should be introduced. Free negotiations implicate that parties have to make signals 
in order to give credible information about their preferences even if that costly process is 
charged as inefficient from an ex post perspective, even if there are many bargaining 
outcomes far from the equal split and even if bargainers may choose to break off negotiations 
with zero payoffs.40 This means to accept the existence of types of bargainers who have 
heterogenous preferences leading to seemingly unfair outcomes in a bargaining environment. 
If the purpose is to keep the impact on bargaining behavior at a minimum and to achieve 
results similar to the no-arbitration treatment in the sense that bargaining types reveal their 
differing preferences, conventional arbitration may be favored. This kind of safety net can be 
knit only at the cost of a modified chilling effect. To ensure an even tighter safety net, not 
only excluding disputes but also inducing agreements according to an accepted convention, 
the number of available awards should be restricted to the two final offers. The consequence 
is that there will be a destiny effect: Splits beyond the convention will almost be excluded. 
The crucial difference between the three treatments can always be observed in the cross-
matchings. While matchings of the same types usually lead to the equal split (arbitration is 
only sometimes needed to realize the equal split if two far bargainers were matched), 
matching between different types lead to strongly differing outcomes in the three treatments. 
In the BR treatment most far bargainers realized an unequal splitting of the pie in their favor. 
In the CCA treatment, they were able to realize an unequal split in their favor if they asked 
for arbitration. In the FOA treatment, there were almost no unequal splits and if there was 
one, it was in favor of the close bargainer. (This is an implication which was also found to a 
certain extent by Deck and Farmer [2003] although there approach completely differed from 
the present one since they had a different information setting). 
It should be emphasized that this clear result was deduced from a simple bargaining situation 
where negotiations had welfare consequences for the bargainers but not for third parties. For 
future research it might be interesting to analyze the impact of the two arbitration designs in 
more complex situations. Variations are that the bargaining outcome might directly affect 
third parties (in terms of efficiency), and that the arbitrators in order to be able to decide about 
the award, will need information that can be influenced by the negotiating parties. 
Moreover, the present experiment was designed as one-shot experiment where bargaining 
parties had no chance to learn about the attitudes and awards of the arbitrators. This outcome 
                                                 
40 Chatterjee and Samuelson [1983] showed that bargaining under incomplete information will not happen in a 
pareto-efficient manner. The approach of Charness [2000] made clear that there are other ways of exchanging 
information about bargainer types in a less costly manner. 24 
is an important result insofar, as many bargaining situations in reality are happening as one-
shot, as well, where the bargaining parties have no chance to adjust their behavior in the 
future to their learning experience. Nevertheless, there are also numerous situations where 
bargainers play repeated games. Given that arbitrators tended to favor split-the-difference 
awards in the CCA treatment and the final offers which were closest to the equal split in the 
FOA treatment, it is also worth to conduct experiments with repeated bargaining. With 
respect to the two arbitration treatment it would then be interesting to see whether there 
would be a tendency towards extreme demands under CCA and to a 100% equal split rate 
under FOA. With respect to the CCA design it is also important to better understand under 
what conditions arbitrators will make independent awards and under what conditions they let 
themselves be influenced by the bargaining behavior of the two parties. 
Since bargaining outside of the laboratory takes place in more complex environments, we 
may ask to what extent our results help understand real-live phenomena. The present 
approach analyzes an environment where information about pie sizes, individual claims etc. 
are common knowledge. In this context it is possible to reveal the fundamental interdependies 
between subjective preferences and arbitration schemes on the bargaining process. As soon as 
further variables (as the above suggested variations) are considered, their influence may 
surface the phenomena observed in the present experiment. Then it would be almost 
impossible to trace back to the causalities of a certain behavior. Insofar, the present insights 
are an important benchmark for future research in more realistic environments.41 
                                                 
41 Theoretical results showing into this direction were already derived by Armstrong and Hurley [2002] who 
‘calculated’ the optimal impasse offers for both types of arbitration. 25 
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treatment observations ∅ first claim disputes
BR  50  180 (69%) 4 (8%)
CCA  50  192 (74%) 17 (34%)
FOA  50  178 (69%)  7 (14%)
Table 1:   Summary of first claims in ECU and frequencies of disputes.  
(For significance of differences see section 4) 
 
 
treatment  ∅ first 
claim  
∅ impasse 






∅ final payoff 





BR  dispute  220 (85%)  165 (64%) ------ 00  5.67
BR     agree  176 (68%)  19/27 152 (59%)  3.44
CCA  dispute  224 (86%)   173 (67%) 6/11 151* (58%)  4.29
CCA     agree  176 (68%)  27/6 136 (53%)  3.54
FOA    dispute  178 (69%)  168 (65%) (2/5) 118
♣ (46%)  5.00
FOA       agree  178 (69%)  39/4 140 (54%)  4.09
Table 2: Average offers and payoffs in ECU, bargaining periods, and divisions of the pie. 
*Average payoff of far bargainer if award was according to difference splitting (11 cases) 
♣Average payoff of far bargainer if award was in favor of close bargainer (5 cases) 
Final claims and payoffs are displayed as if the pie was of full size. 
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First claim  BR  CCA  FOA 
-120  1 (2%)  1 (2%)  1 (2%) 
121-140  11 (22%)  10 (20%)  7 (14%) 
141-165  14 (28%)  4 (8%)  15 (30%) 
166-180  2 (4%)  5 (10%)  6 (12%) 
181-200  3 (6%)  12 (24%)  11 (22%) 
201-220  4 (8%)  3 (6%)  5 (10%) 
221-240  11 (22%)  10 (20%)  4 (8%) 
241-259  4 (8%)  5 (10%)  1 (2%) 





1/2 3 4 5 6  and 
more 
BR  13 (26%)  12 (24%) 10 (20%) 8 (16%) 7 (14%) 
CCA  4 (8%)  22 (44%) 11 (22%) 7 (14%) 6 (12%) 
FOA  8 (16%)  11 (22%) 9 (18%) 11 (22%) 11 (22%) 
Table 4: Number of bargaining periods in the BR, CCA and FOA treatment 30 
 
 
Figure 1a: Opening and impasse offers of the 12 matchings of far with close bargainer in the 
CCA treatment and awards of the conventional arbitrators. 
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demand of far bargainer
offer of close bargainer
♣ opening offer of far bargainer                           ♠ impasse offer of far bargainer        ×  award of conventional arbitrater
♦ opening offer of close bargainer ♥ impasse offer of close bargainer31 
Figure 1b: Opening and impasse offers of the five matchings of far with far bargainer in the 
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Figure 2: Opening and impasse offers in the FOA treatment. (The award was always the 
impasse offer of the close bargainer)  
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♠ impasse offer of close bargainer
♦ impasse offer of far bargainer
♥ opening offer of close bargainer
♣ opening offer of far bargainer
demand of far bargainer 
offer of close bargainer33 
Appendix A: Bargaining Record 
 
date:                                                            Game Nr: 
Bargaining record                    started at:                                                    Group Nr: 
                                                 Finished at:                                                          
 
I demand for myself: 
 
offer 
      Nr.        by 
Party I  Party II  arbitrator  Actual size of 
pie 
1 
  I 
    259 
2 
  II 
    259 
3 
  I 
    249 
4 
  II 
    239 
5 
  I 
    229 
6 
  II 
    219 
7 
  I 
    209 
8 
  II 
    199 
9 
  I 
    189 
10 
  II 
    179 
11 
  I 
    169 
12 
  II 
    159 
13 
  I 
    149 
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Appendix B: Instructions for Party I: 
You take part in a bargaining experiment between two parties, you are party I, the other 
person is party II. There is a pie with a size of 259 Experimental Currency Units (ECU) and 
you have to bargain with the other party about the splitting of the pie. Party II will be selected 
at random from the group of participants in the other room. All pairings are anonymous. 
In the first bargaining period you are entitled to make the opening offer where you may 
suggest how to divide the 259 ECU. Party II can either reject or accept your offer. In case of 
rejection party II may make a counteroffer. From the third period on you may in odd-
numbered and the other party may in even-numbered periods continue to make alternating 
offers. Any further proposal beyond period two induces a shrinking pie of 10 ECU per period. 
After period 1, you are free to make a decision according to one of the following four choices: 
1)  You make an offer to the other party where you suggest how to split the pie. 
2)  You ask the other party for another offer without making an offer by yourself. 
3)  You accept the last offer of the other party. 
4)  You break down the negotiations [and (in treatment 2 and3) ask for arbitration]. 
Make a decision according to one of the four choices. Write down your decision into the 
bargaining record. After making your decision the sheet will be transferred to the other party. 
The negotiations will end either if one of the two parties agrees to the splitting of the pie 
suggested by the other party or if one party decides to break down negotiations. If you 
succeed to make an agreement, both parties will get paid according to that agreement. If you 
decide to break down negotiations, then 
[in treatment 1] both parties will receive no payment at all. 
[in treatment 2] you may ask for conventional arbitration. The arbitrator will receive your 
bargaining record and will make a decision of his own choice. You have to accept the 
decision of the arbitrator. Then you will receive payments according to the award of the 
arbitrator. 
[in treatment 3] you may ask for final offer arbitration. The arbitrator will receive your 
bargaining record. The arbirtrator has to choose one of the two final offers as award. You 
have to accept the decision of the arbitrator. Then you will receive payments according to the 
award of the arbitrator. 
Earnings are confidential. Only you and a third person not involved in the experiment will 
know the amount you earned. Each ECU is worth 0.10 DM (0,051 Euro). 
If you like you may comment your decisions on the back side of this instruction. If at any 
time you have questions or problems, raise your hand and you will be assisted. 